Serbia’s gas market is no longer a purely contractual story about volumes bought from one supplier and delivered through one route. It is becoming a system defined by three constraints that now dominate every economic outcome: how much gas Serbia can physically import through alternative corridors, how much it can withdraw from storage during winter […]
South-East Europe’s gas market has stopped behaving like a collection of national utilities buying pipeline molecules and passing them through regulated tariffs. It is turning into a corridor-and-liquidity system where the marginal price is increasingly set by LNG access, storage withdrawal rates, and cross-border interconnector capacity rather than by any single long-term contract. The region
Hungary’s expansion in Serbia is no longer a set of isolated deals. It is increasingly legible as a two-track strategy that uses MOL on the hydrocarbons and retail side, and MVM Group on the power, engineering, and system-integration side, with Serbia positioned as both a demand hub and a transit corridor between Central Europe and the wider Balkans. The
South-East European refining is not defined by refinery nameplates alone. It is defined by who controls crude access, who can finance inventories through cycles, and who owns the corridors that physically move oil. In this system, refineries behave less like isolated industrial plants and more like nodes inside a politically and financially constrained logistics network.
South-East Europe’s refining system and Serbia’s turning point under a MOL takeover Read More »
When the CBAM lens that has already reshaped thinking on green electricity is applied rigorously to natural gas, the conclusion is stark. Gas does not behave like a neutral transition fuel in a CBAM-constrained export economy. It behaves like a structural risk variable whose price volatility, emissions intensity, and perception by EU buyers increasingly determine
Gas under CBAM: Why Serbia’s transition fuel becomes a structural competitiveness risk Read More »
Serbia still has a narrow but realistic window to position itself as a near-shore green manufacturing hub for EU supply chains. Geography, labour costs, industrial depth, and trade access are not the binding constraints. The binding constraint is energy credibility—specifically, whether Serbia can deliver reliable, scalable, and auditable green electricity to energy-intensive exporters under CBAM
Serbia as a near-shore green manufacturing hub — what must change before 2030 Read More »
For most of the last decade, power purchase agreements in Serbia were evaluated on a single dominant variable: price. The lowest strike won, and everything else was secondary. Under CBAM, that logic breaks down. For energy-intensive exporters, the commercial value of a PPA is no longer defined by how cheap the electricity looks on paper,
Industrial PPAs in Serbia: Why price is secondary to shape, certainty and proof Read More »
Serbia’s energy transition is still described almost entirely in megawatts. New projects are announced in MW, targets are framed in MW, and public debate treats capacity additions as if they were interchangeable with usable energy. For CBAM-exposed exporters, this framing is not just incomplete—it is actively misleading. What determines competitiveness under CBAM is not how
From MW to TWh: Why Serbia’s energy transition metrics are misleading exporters Read More »
Serbia’s response to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is quietly drifting toward a solar-heavy narrative. This is understandable. Solar is modular, politically visible, quick to announce, and easy to frame in megawatts. But for CBAM-exposed industrial buyers, this approach is structurally flawed. It confuses installed capacity with delivered value and mistakes headline decarbonisation optics
Wind as Serbia’s CBAM backbone: Why solar-heavy decarbonisation fails industrial buyers Read More »
In Serbia’s debate on CBAM exposure, grid infrastructure is still treated as a background constraint—important, but secondary. That framing is dangerously wrong. For CBAM-exposed exporters, grid delays function as an unlegislated carbon tax, imposed not by Brussels but by physics, timing, and procurement logic. Unlike formal CBAM charges, this tax does not appear on invoices.
