The Western Balkans and Southeast Europe are entering a new strategic energy era, one in which electricity — its production, exchange, security, and geopolitical meaning — carries more weight than gas pipelines ever did. By 2035, the region’s power map will look radically different from anything recognizable today. Coal will decline, hydropower will fluctuate under […]
The quiet decision to lift Serbia’s decades-old ban on nuclear power has triggered a shift in the strategic imagination of the region. For the first time since the Chernobyl-era prohibition, Serbia can legally and politically evaluate the possibility of constructing nuclear reactors — a move that has implications far beyond electricity production. It touches geopolitics,
For more than two decades, Serbia’s energy model rested on a simple premise: that natural gas would remain a stable, reasonably priced and geopolitically reliable cornerstone of the country’s heating, industrial processing and urban energy landscapes. The assumption was rooted in geography and politics. Russia supplied the gas, Serbia built the pipelines, and households and
After Russian gas: Who wins Serbia’s electrification shift? Read More »
Serbia’s electricity system is approaching a moment of structural tension that is no longer a distant or speculative threat. It is unfolding now, in real time, in the daily dispatch decisions of operators, in the widening gap between generation capabilities and system needs, and in the increasingly visible fragility of balancing mechanisms that once seemed
Serbia is entering an energy decade unlike any it has experienced since the post-Yugoslav restructuring of its power sector. But while most public attention focuses on the role of coal, the rise of renewables or the political weight of nuclear ambitions, the real hinge of Serbia’s energy future lies elsewhere — inside the steel corridors
For almost four decades, Serbia lived under a symbolic and legislative boundary that shaped its entire energy identity: a ban on the construction of nuclear power plants, introduced in the late Yugoslav era after the Chernobyl disaster. That prohibition was not only a legal framework but a psychological marker that defined how the country imagined
When Elektroprivreda Srbije announced that it would offtake electricity from the Alibunar 1 and Alibunar 2 wind parks — a combined 168 megawatts of new renewable capacity — the statement appeared modest, almost procedural. Serbia has been adding wind capacity for nearly a decade, and private developers have taken the lead in most recent projects.
For years, Naftna industrija Srbije (NIS) occupied a unique position in Serbia’s economy. It was not merely the country’s dominant oil and gas company; it was a symbol of operational continuity, consistent profitability and strategic relevance. Its earnings supported the state budget, underpinned public finances and served as a buffer in times of economic uncertainty.
Serbia’s long-term energy vision is increasingly shaped by the pressures of decarbonization, European integration, regional competition and the emerging economics of renewable power. Yet the country is confronting a reality that many policymakers hesitate to state openly: a rapid phase-out of coal is not realistically achievable under current system conditions. This sentiment, echoed by energy experts
Serbia closed the previous year with one of the most striking statistics in its recent energy history: 48 percent of all electricity generated came from renewable sources, according to government data. At first glance, the figure appears to position Serbia among Europe’s more advanced energy-transition performers, surpassing several EU members in renewable penetration. With hydropower providing
