Europe’s energy transformation is most visible in electricity markets and gas security strategies. But underneath those headline developments, another strategic system continues to shape economies, geopolitics and vulnerabilities: oil. Unlike gas, oil has not disappeared from Europe’s energy conversation. Unlike electricity, it cannot be redesigned via market rules into cleaner form. Oil remains physical, global, politically sensitive and indispensable in sectors where alternatives are not yet realistically mature. And in South-East Europe, the story of oil is not one of quiet continuity — it is a test of geopolitical exposure, industrial transition capability, refining resilience, sanctions politics and whether the region can evolve in step with Europe’s next industrial phase or remain structurally tied to yesterday’s world.
Europe’s oil system has undergone a quieter but equally profound transformation since 2022. Sanctions, embargoes, price caps, redirected flows, expanded Middle Eastern and US imports, the rise of “shadow fleet” dynamics, new logistic routes and a new dependency pattern have replaced the old reliance on Russian crude. Western Europe absorbed this transformation with diversified import channels, powerful refining hubs, strong financial institutions and regulatory discipline. South-East Europe did not have the same structural capacity. Instead, it experienced the shift as a stress test of whether political systems, infrastructure and corporate ownership models could adapt without destabilizing national economies.
Oil, unlike gas, is easier to move. Tankers bypass geopolitics in ways pipelines cannot. That simplicity, however, hides the real complexity: refining structures, ownership realities, logistics infrastructure and compliance with European sanctions architecture. South-East Europe sits in the most complicated part of this equation. Legacy refinery ownership, Russian-linked influence, strategic coastal import nodes, landlocked dependencies and fragile political economies create an environment where oil is not just fuel. It is power. It is leverage. It is vulnerability. And it is a definition of whether modernisation is happening or being performed rhetorically while old structures remain intact.
Serbia remains the clearest symbol of this entanglement. Oil in Serbia is not simply an industrial commodity. It is a politically and geopolitically embedded sector influenced historically by Russian ownership through NIS and economic interdependence chains that extend beyond fuel supply into broader political negotiation realities. Serbia has imported oil through complex arrangements, balancing sanctions environments, ownership pressure dynamics and real security of supply needs. Oil here reveals something very important: when diversification is not fully institutionalised and when ownership structures have external strategic interests, energy becomes a negotiating position rather than a neutral market product. Serbia is now increasingly aware that long-term stability requires diversification not only of fuels, but of influence.
Bulgaria illustrates how refinery ownership can shape national vulnerability. The Lukoil-controlled Burgas refinery has long been central to Bulgaria’s domestic fuel stability and regional supply dynamics. Sanctions pressure, EU compliance obligations and the need to gradually move away from Russian crude dependence have forced Sofia into one of the most politically sensitive economic transitions in its modern history. Oil dependence in Bulgaria is not about cars and diesel. It is about employment, fiscal revenue, political credibility and EU trust. When a refinery becomes both a national economic pillar and a geopolitical question, policy becomes extremely delicate. Bulgaria’s challenge is transforming dependency into resilience without collapsing stability. That is not a technical exercise. It is a strategic balancing act.
Greece, by contrast, enters the oil conversation from a position of maritime and refining strength. As a major refinery centre and home to one of the world’s most significant shipping fleets, Greece is a structural actor in Europe’s oil ecosystem. Its refineries supply not only domestic demand but also serve the wider region. Its shipping sector plays a defining, if controversial, role in global oil logistics including the transportation environment shaped by sanctions. Greece is deeply embedded in both the continuity of oil reality and the transition away from its primacy. That dual identity gives Greece leverage, responsibility and scrutiny.
Romania occupies a strategically interesting position. Historically refining strong, industrially capable and with its own upstream tradition, Romania has oil security options that many regional neighbours do not. Its challenge is no longer survival, but strategic alignment: whether it uses its refining, logistics and industrial capability as part of a regional stabilisation function or whether instability, administrative drag and political swings undermine that potential.
Hungary, through its MOL group, is one of the most influential oil actors in the region. MOL’s cross-border footprint gives Hungary strategic reach and relevance beyond national borders. Yet Hungary’s oil policy, much like its gas policy, remains tightly interwoven with national political strategy, pragmatism toward Russian supply and a careful reading of geopolitical cost-benefit realities. Hungary’s decisions cannot be analysed only through technical energy logic; they must be understood through the lens of political sovereignty strategy and economic pragmatism.
Bosnia and Herzegovina again shows how governance paralysis transforms energy risk into structural vulnerability. Oil supply must navigate constitutional complexity and fragmented authority. North Macedonia, with limited domestic capacity and high import dependence, lives with the reality that global price shifts convert into social and political stress quickly.
Montenegro is shaped more by oil as a transport, tourism and economic cost factor than as a refining centre. Coastal storage, logistics relevance and connections to maritime trade routes matter, but Montenegro’s vulnerability lies primarily in exposure to price dynamics rather than industrial structure. However, as a coastal node in an increasingly strategic Adriatic energy corridor, Montenegro’s role in oil logistics cannot be dismissed as peripheral.
Overlay all of this onto Europe’s longer-term direction and a deeper story emerges. Oil demand in Europe will not disappear soon, but it is structurally expected to decline. Electrification of transport, stricter emissions regulation, urban restrictions, the rise of EV fleets, green industrial strategy and carbon pricing all point in one direction: oil is transitioning from a structural economic pillar into a gradually diminishing strategic commodity. Western Europe is preparing for that trajectory. South-East Europe risks arriving late.
For SEE economies, oil still defines mobility, transport economics, agricultural machinery viability, logistics cost structures, household price sensitivity and political stability. Europe is already preparing for a world where oil plays less of a foundational role. South-East Europe still exists in a world where oil shocks can destabilise governments.
That divergence is dangerous. If the EU transitions faster than SEE, the region will face a structural competitiveness gap. Its logistics costs will remain higher. Its transport economy will lag behind electrification. Its exposure to global shocks will remain elevated. Its industrial decarbonisation will remain incomplete. Investors will price that risk brutally.
Yet SEE has opportunities too. Refinery modernisation, diversified crude sourcing, enhanced maritime logistics capacity, strategic coordination with EU security frameworks, integration into alternative fuel development, regional storage optimisation and participation in the creation of a post-oil industrial transition economy could allow SEE to shift from vulnerability to advantage. Romania, Greece and Hungary could act as anchors of stability. Serbia, Bulgaria and others could align transition planning with sovereignty protection. Montenegro, North Macedonia and Bosnia could benefit from stronger integration and coordinated EU-supported transition planning.
The deeper truth remains simple. Oil defines where SEE has been. Electricity and gas define where SEE must go. The transition bridge is not built by rhetoric. It is built by policy integrity, diversification discipline, regional trust and alignment with Europe’s industrial and climate strategy.
If South-East Europe modernises its oil environment while simultaneously accelerating electricity precision and gas resilience, it will finally cease being Europe’s energy risk zone and become a stable contributor to continental security. If it hesitates, it will remain trapped between a declining oil world it cannot fully rely on and a future energy world it has not fully entered.
The energy future of SEE will not be decided by electricity alone, or gas alone, or oil alone. It will be decided by whether the region understands that all three now define one thing: power — economic, industrial and geopolitical. And the time to align with Europe’s next energy reality is not tomorrow. It is now.