Public debate in Serbia over the possible acquisition of Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) retail assets by Hungary’s MOL Group has intensified in recent weeks, with particular focus on whether such a transaction would concentrate too much power in the domestic fuel market. A closer look at market structure, legal thresholds, and the competitive landscape shows that fears of a monopoly are not supported by either current data or Serbia’s competition framework.
At the core of the discussion is the broader restructuring of NIS ownership following geopolitical and sanctions-related pressures. NIS remains Serbia’s largest energy company, operating the Pančevo oil refinery, the country’s only refinery, and the largest nationwide network of petrol stations. For years, the company has been majority owned by Gazprom Neft and Gazprom, a structure that came under direct pressure after new U.S. sanctions targeting Russian-owned energy assets in late 2025. Those measures effectively require the exit of Russian capital if NIS is to continue operating without restrictions and retain access to international trade, insurance, and financing channels.
Against that backdrop, MOL has emerged as the most credible strategic buyer. The Hungarian group already operates refineries and retail networks across Central and Eastern Europe and has longstanding commercial ties in the region. Talks have focused primarily on acquiring the Russian-owned stake in NIS, which would result in a fundamental shift in ownership but not automatically in market dominance.
The most visible concern for consumers is fuel retail. Petrol stations are a tangible part of everyday life, and the idea of one company “owning all the pumps” resonates more strongly than abstract debates about refining capacity or shareholder structure. However, the actual numbers tell a different story.
According to data available for 2025, NIS operates just over 21% of Serbia’s petrol stations by number. MOL, for its part, has a relatively small footprint, accounting for roughly 3.5% of stations, or around 70–75 locations, depending on classification. Even if MOL were to acquire the NIS retail network in full, the combined entity would control approximately 25–26% of the total fuel retail market.
That figure is critical in legal terms. Serbia’s competition framework, enforced by the Commission for Protection of Competition, uses a 40% market share as the key threshold at which a concentration is presumed capable of creating a dominant position. Below that level, a transaction does not automatically trigger a full antitrust investigation, and dominance cannot be assumed without additional, extraordinary circumstances.
In practical terms, a combined NIS–MOL retail share of around one quarter of the market sits well below the level that Serbian law associates with monopoly power. It also remains far from the structure seen in genuinely concentrated fuel markets, where one or two players often control 50–70% of outlets and logistics simultaneously.
The structure of Serbia’s fuel market further weakens monopoly arguments. In addition to NIS and MOL, the country hosts a range of international and regional operators, including OMV, Lukoil, and several independent chains and wholesalers. Many of these players have strong positions in specific regions or along key transit corridors, and entry barriers at the retail level are not prohibitive. Fuel pricing remains highly transparent, closely tracked by regulators and consumers alike, limiting the scope for unilateral price-setting even by the largest operator.
It is also important to distinguish between retail presence and systemic control. While NIS is the sole operator of a domestic refinery, fuel retail is not a vertically closed system. Serbia imports significant volumes of petroleum products, and non-NIS retailers routinely source fuel through imports or alternative supply arrangements. Ownership of petrol stations does not equate to control over fuel supply in the way it might in a fully closed market.
From a competition-law perspective, regulators would look not only at station counts, but also at factors such as barriers to entry, countervailing buyer power, and the ability of competitors to expand. None of these indicators currently point to a situation in which a MOL–NIS combination would be able to exclude rivals or dictate prices across the market.
The strategic logic of the transaction lies elsewhere. For Serbia, the overriding concern is energy security and continuity of refining operations. The Pančevo refinery is a critical asset for the country’s fuel supply, employment, and balance of payments. Ensuring that it remains operational under ownership acceptable to Western regulators is a higher-order policy issue than marginal shifts in retail market share.
For MOL, the attraction is primarily industrial and regional. Control over NIS would strengthen its refining and logistics position in Southeast Europe, integrate Serbia more firmly into a Central European energy system, and provide scale advantages in procurement and distribution. Retail expansion is a secondary outcome, not the main driver.
This distinction matters because competition authorities typically assess intent and effect together. A transaction aimed at stabilizing ownership and maintaining supply is viewed differently from one designed to eliminate competitors. In this case, the evidence points clearly toward the former.
Public concern about monopolies is understandable, particularly in sectors like fuel where prices are politically and socially sensitive. But competition analysis relies on measurable thresholds and market behavior, not perception alone. On those measures, a MOL acquisition of NIS retail assets would leave Serbia with a fuel market that remains fragmented, competitive, and open to imports and new entrants.
If the deal proceeds, scrutiny will not disappear. Regulators will still monitor pricing behavior, supply conditions, and access to infrastructure. Any abuse of market position, regardless of formal market share, would remain subject to sanction. What the current data shows, however, is that the transaction itself does not meet the legal or economic definition of a monopoly.
In the wider context of sanctions, energy security, and regional integration, the debate over fuel pumps risks obscuring the real issue. The central question is not whether MOL would “own too many stations,” but whether Serbia can secure a stable, compliant owner for its most important energy company without disrupting supply. On that front, the proposed transaction represents a strategic shift — but not a competitive threat to the fuel market as Serbian law defines it.