In South-East Europe, energy strategy has never simply been a technical expression of infrastructure planning. It has always been deeply political, economically sensitive, geopolitically shaped and socially charged. Nuclear power sits right at the center of that tension. It promises long-term stability in a region burdened with volatility. It offers strategic independence in markets traditionally exposed to external vulnerability. But it also requires a level of institutional competence, financial discipline and political maturity that this region has not always demonstrated consistently.
Today, South-East Europe stands at the most consequential nuclear question it has faced in decades: does nuclear become a defining structural pillar of the region’s energy future, or does it remain an ambition that reality never properly supports?
Historically, nuclear has been a defining backbone only in parts of the region. Bulgaria’s Kozloduy nuclear plant has anchored its domestic stability for decades. Romania’s Cernavodă has been a reliability asset and symbol of serious energy planning. Hungary doubled down on nuclear earlier than most, expanding Paks with strategic clarity even when others hesitated. Croatia and Slovenia share Krško, a rare example of regional nuclear cooperation that actually works.
Beyond those states, however, nuclear has traditionally lived only in future plans and political speeches rather than as built capacity. Serbia once had nuclear ambitions before abandoning them decades ago. Bosnia and Herzegovina never developed it. Greece moved away. Montenegro and North Macedonia remain outside the nuclear discussion entirely in practical terms. The region therefore entered the 2020s divided: part nuclear-anchored, part nuclear-absent.
Then the global energy shock changed the psychology.
Gas volatility reminded governments that dependence comes with a price. Electricity imports at painful rates reminded countries that “market reliance” without domestic capacity equals exposure. Climate policy and decarbonization pressures escalated, making coal’s long-term survival increasingly unrealistic. Hydrology became unreliable under climate variability. Renewables grew — but without sufficient baseload replacement, they risked creating fragility instead of strength.
Suddenly, nuclear stopped being philosophical. It became practical again.
For countries such as Romania, the choice is now strategic reaffirmation rather than reconsideration. It is moving toward reactor expansion, and even exploring small modular reactors as a structural complement. Bulgaria debates additional reactors as part of its future stability logic. Hungary continues its nuclear trajectory unapologetically.
For states without nuclear, the conversation has returned to the mainstream — particularly in Serbia, where discussions about whether nuclear should at least be reconsidered have moved from taboo to legitimate policy debate.
Yet the market and political realities of South-East Europe complicate this picture.
The region does not operate in fully liberalized, high-liquidity electricity environments like North-West Europe. Market structures are mixed. State utilities remain dominant. Tariff politics remain socially sensitive. Budget capacity is limited. Risk appetite is cautious. And nuclear projects require confidence in areas South-East Europe still struggles with: predictable governance, disciplined long-term planning, regulatory maturity and unwavering execution capability.
- Nuclear is not a short-horizon asset. It is a century-scale commitment:
- ten to fifteen years of planning and construction;
- forty to sixty years of operation;
- decades beyond that of decommissioning stewardship.
Few political cultures in SEE are built around such timelines.
Financially, the region also faces constraints. Nuclear funding structures require sovereign guarantees, international partnerships, complex financing instruments and stable rule-of-law environments to satisfy lenders. Every instability in governance raises financing cost. Every regulatory uncertainty extends project timelines. Every political reshuffle risks re-opening strategic decisions rather than confirming continuity.
Yet the counterargument is stronger: not building nuclear also has a price.
Without nuclear, SEE countries face a future where:
• coal declines progressively under environmental and structural stress
• gas remains vulnerable, politically sensitive and ultimately transitional
• hydropower remains weather-dependent
• renewables expand but require stable baseload to prevent systemic fragility
A region with weak baseload anchors is a region permanently exposed to volatility. And volatility means expensive imports, unstable electricity pricing, fragile competitiveness and political vulnerability.
Which is exactly why nuclear now sits not at the margin of strategic debate — but at its center.
The intersection between nuclear and the market in SEE therefore becomes a negotiation between reality and ambition. Nuclear cannot be financed by market forces alone in this region. It requires state strategy. But once deployed, nuclear stabilizes those very markets by reducing exposure, smoothing prices and anchoring confidence.
The countries that understand that duality — strategy first, market benefit second — will define the region’s new energy architecture. Those that hide behind hesitation will remain permanently reactive in a world increasingly unforgiving to reactive states.
South-East Europe does not need nuclear because it is fashionable.
It needs it because the future without firm, resilient capacity is structurally unstable.
Whether the region is ready to match ambition with competence remains the decisive question.